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I. INTRODUCTION 
Sometimes the public gets it wrong, even on relatively simple questions of 
fact. For example, recent polls indicate that a majority of the US adult population 
continue to believe that a deity created humans in their present form (46%), while a 
large minority recognize that humans have evolved, but maintain that a deity 
“guided the process” (32%). Only 15% hold that humans evolved in a process 
devoid of supernatural interference. (Gallup Politics, 2012)  
Presumably, few would dispute that public opinion can be and sometimes is 
mistaken, in the manner indicated by such examples. After all, the difficulty of 
forming an accurate opinion under the constraints we all face as epistemic agents is 
one of the reasons why most countries capable of doing so educate and employ 
highly specialized experts to research and assess complex issues. And yet, in public 
and political debates on punishment one is likely sooner or later to run into 
statements along the lines of: “The leniency with which the courts treat serious 
criminals offends the public’s sense of justice.” When such statements are offered, 
it is typically either implied or concluded that the discrepancy between popular 
sentiments and the sentences meted out by courts can justify revising penal codes 
to remove or diminish the discrepancy. Proponents of this view, penal populists, 
affirm what I shall call the claim of popular punishment:  
The basic claim of popular punishment: We ought to 
punish in accord with popular sentiments about 
punishment.  
When it comes to punishment, at least, public opinion is considered by penal 
populists to give us reason in and of itself to adjust policy. What are we to make of 
this? Is it a sensible view? 
Despite its prevalence, the claim of popular punishment is a curiously 
underexplored topic. And to the extent that it has received attention from 
academics, the approach has often been the mirror opposite of the proponents’: 
since penal populism is (obviously!) evil and counter-productive what we need to 
do is explain why it is that it occurs and find a way to stop its spread of contagion 
to justice. (E.g. Pettit, 2002; Pratt, 2007; Lacey, 2008; for opposed arguments cf. 
Roberts, 2011; Dzur, 2012) Perhaps there is no great mystery here, and the 
normative issues are as clear-cut as assumed by (some) proponents and critics, but I 
suspect that this is not the case, and that it may be worth therefore to give the 
normative claim of popular punishment more of a run for its money. My main 
purpose in this article is to investigate the ways in which such a claim can be 
supported by an argument.  
I proceed as follows: I first explore and attempt to clarify the claim of 
popular punishment, i.e. the idea that we ought to punish in accord with how 
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popular sentiments hold that we ought to punish. I then illustrate the general 
structure that an argument to support the claim must have, and distinguish between 
three ways of filling out the critical second premise. Finally, I investigate each of 
these three attempts to complete the argument in turn and demonstrate the 
difficulty of making the argument at once plausible and potent. I conclude that only 
one version of the argument can be successful, and that the limited circumstances 
under which it applies, as well as the demanding background conditions for its 
plausibility makes it far less interesting than proponents tend to assume. Thus, I 
shall reveal myself as a moderate critic of the claim rather than a proponent, but I 
believe that all parties can benefit from the increased clarity about the terms of the 
debate that it is my hope and principal purpose to provide in this paper. 
II. STAKING THE CLAIM 
In thinking about the claim of popular punishment we need to separate two 
issues: the question of whether and if so how to involve the public in the 
institutions that shape penal policy (e.g. Lovegrove, 1998; Morgan, 2002; Pettit, 
2002; Dzur and Mirchandani, 2007; Pratt, 2007; Lacey, 2008; Dzur, 2012) and the 
question of what a good reason for shaping penal policy one way or the other 
would be. (e.g. Golash and Lynch, 1995; Bagaric and Edney, 2004; Robinson and 
Darley, 2007; Ryberg, 2010; Roberts, 2011) We might call them the participatory 
and the justificatory issues of the relation between popular opinion and punishment 
respectively. The two issues are at risk of being conflated because they both 
involve taking public opinion into consideration, but deciding whether and if so 
how to do so in the first manner – by allowing the public to participate in or 
influence the decision-making procedure – does not exhaust the scope of the issue. 
Of the two issues, I shall be concerned only with the second and I intend to 
bracket the question of what the best arrangement of the relevant institutions would 
be; whatever your preferred model, feel free to assume that we are dealing with it. 
In a slogan, my concern is not who should deliberate, but which reasons should 
carry weight in the deliberations of those that do. 
Having determined the scope of the discussion, it may be worth exploring 
the components of the claim itself in slightly greater detail. I suggested above that 
the fundamental idea of penal populism could be boiled down to the basic claim 
that “we ought to punish in accord with popular sentiments about punishment”. I 
shall discuss three points in turn regarding sentiments, information, and conflicts. 
First, it is worth asking what exactly we are to understand by “popular 
sentiments”. I mean for the term to capture the foundation of this specific type of 
argument, which could be referred to also as e.g. “the public’s sense of justice”, 
“our common-sense feeling of right and wrong”, etc., and I suggest the following 
working definition: 
Popular sentiments: A popular sentiment is a widely 
shared (within the society at stake) belief with normative 
content, e.g. “we ought to punish offence O with 
punishment P”. 
Furthermore, I employ the term ‘sentiment’ in order to stress the particular 
character of the beliefs at stake in this discussion. These are, as I think penal 
populists will admit, arrived at through largely unconscious judgments, intuitive 
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and normally strongly emotionally laden. For comparison, we could imagine that 
public opinion held that crime O ought to be punished with P because the members 
had all individually applied a particular theory of criminal justice, such as 
communicative retributivism qua Antony Duff (Duff, 2001) or utilitarian 
deterrence-theory qua Jeremy Bentham (Bentham, 1996 [[1789]]), carefully and 
consciously calculated the weight of the moral factors emphasised by the theory 
given the relevant empirical conditions and concluded that P was the correct 
answer to what justice required. However, not only is it obviously not the case that 
the public sentiments which penal populists demand we show consideration are 
derived in this manner, but it also seems to me that if public sentiments were 
derived in this manner they would not be the type of beliefs that the argument is 
supposed to capture.2 (cf. Robinson and Darley, 2007, p.4-8)   
Second, a traditional distinction with regards to popular sentiments on 
punishment separates sentiments that are and are not informed. By uninformed 
sentiments we are to understand something like the average layperson’s sentiment, 
based as this typically is on a limited and superficial knowledge of criminology, the 
law, the penal system and the crimes, criminals and victims. By informed 
sentiments, on the other hand, we are to understand the sentiment that the same 
person has once in possession of a reasonable amount of relevant information about 
these topics.3 Clearly, if interpreted as a binary concept this would be too crude, 
but however we graduate it, it raises an important problem: given that there will in 
at least some cases be a difference between a person’s lesser and more informed 
sentiments, which of the two sentiments are we to take as the basis of the claim for 
popular punishment?4 
In the following I shall assume that we can give lexical priority to more 
informed sentiments in intrapersonal comparisons, that is, we can assume that 
whenever a person’s lesser and more informed sentiments diverge we can ignore 
the less informed and give full credit to the more informed sentiments.5 For 
simplicity’s sake, I shall mostly refer to these simply as sentiments. 
Third, the requirement that the sentiment be widely shared is slightly 
inaccurate. In practice it seems to me that any version of the argument will have to 
understand popular sentiments in a way that meets the following condition: The 
strength of the claim must correlate with both the strength of the sentiment and its 
prevalence. The more persons share the sentiment and/or the stronger the sentiment 
is, the stronger reason we have to punish in accordance with the sentiment. An 
implication of this condition is that to the extent that intractable disagreements 
exist in the relevant population, that is, when popular sentiments are genuinely 
divided, there will be conflicting reasons. The proponent of popular punishment 
can accept this implication, I believe, without undue concern. After all, there is no 
reason why the claim would have to be that there is an exclusive reason, and it 
seems perfectly legitimate to let the claim cash out in practice e.g. as one reason 
outweighing the others (because it is stronger held or more prevalent), its resulting 
strength being weakened by contrary sentiments, but so long as it outweighs them 
still counting as a reason in favour of adjusting penal practices in the appropriate 
direction.6 Given these clarifications, we might restate the claim of the argument to 
be: 
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The revised claim of popular punishment: We ought to 
punish in accord with informed popular sentiments about 
punishment, the strength of this claim varying in direct 
proportion to both the strength and the prevalence of the 
sentiment.  
This is a workable definition, but I will suggest that we make two further 
small qualifications to the revised version of the claim. First, I have already 
discussed the claim by referring to competing ‘reasons’, and I believe that we can 
achieve greater clarity by rephrasing the normative claim in terms of a reason 
rather than the less precise “ought”. But the reason at stake is clearly a pro tanto 
reason, not a decisive (“all things considered”) reason. I believe proponents of 
popular punishment ought to accept that there can be other reasons for or against a 
particular punishment than those based on popular sentiments, and even that these 
other reasons can potentially outweigh the reason supplied by the claim of popular 
punishment.7 Even if some might wish to challenge this, I will stick to this 
assumption since it extends maximal charity to the proponent: the moderate claim 
of a pro tanto reason is less demanding, while conversely if the case for a pro tanto 
reason fails then the case for a decisive reason cannot succeed. 
Secondly, we need to limit the acceptable type of reason. To illustrate why, 
consider the fact that there may be persons who hold what is intuitively the wrong 
kind of reason for adjusting penal practices to fit popular punishment. At the risk of 
being cynical, it seems that this is true of some politicians who are proponents of 
popular punishment, e.g. because they believe this will aid in their reelection. 
Clearly, they have a reason for adjusting penal practices, but their self-interested 
reason for the advancement of a political career is not the kind of reason that will 
satisfactorily support the claim of popular punishment. There may be different 
suggestions for how to properly constrain the range of appropriate reasons, but I 
believe that impartiality will do the trick. By an impartial reason I understand a 
reason that applies independently of the situation of the individual agent.8 This 
condition rules out the kind of reason available to the self-serving populist 
politician since that reason only applies given her individual situation as a 
politician seeking reelection.  
We can introduce these two qualifications explicitly to more accurately 
specify the claim: 
The minimal claim of popular punishment: There is at 
least one impartial pro tanto reason to punish in accord 
with informed popular sentiments about punishment, the 
strength of this reason varying in direct proportion to 
both the strength and the prevalence of the sentiment.  
This is the claim that I shall take popular punishment to hold, and the 
minimal conclusion that an argument capable of supporting popular punishment 
must achieve. Let us turn therefore to how such an argument might look. 
III. THE ARGUMENT(S) 
The minimal claim of popular punishment is not self-evidently true, so we 
will want an argument to support it. Let me start by saying a little about how I 
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think we should understand an argument like this to work. In practice, the basic 
structure of the argument is frequently something like the following:  
i) Popular sentiments about punishment hold that offence 
O ought to receive punishment P.  
QED: Hence we ought to punish O with P.  
As is apparent, the argument contains (or at least, must contain, to be valid) 
an implicit premise, connecting the first premise with the conclusion; something 
along the lines of:  
ii) If popular sentiments hold that O ought to be punished 
with P, then we ought to punish O with P. 
But although logically sufficient, as banal a premise as this would be 
unsatisfactory, because it is not apparent why or that we ought to accept it. 
Proponents of popular punishment must come up with a more plausible version of 
the second premise.  
The argument for popular punishment, then, taking into account the minimal 
version of the claim I developed in the preceding section and the necessary 
elaboration mentioned above must look something like the following: 
i) Popular sentiments about punishment hold that offence 
O ought to receive punishment P.  
ii) If popular sentiments hold that O ought to be punished 
with P, then there is at least one impartial pro tanto 
reason to punish O with P, the strength of this reason 
varying in direct proportion to both the strength and the 
prevalence of the sentiment, because (……………). 
QED: There is at least one impartial pro tanto reason to 
punish to punish O with P, the strength of this reason 
varying in direct proportion to both the strength and the 
prevalence of the sentiment. 
In addition, whatever elaboration of the second premise the proponent offers, 
it must be capable of meeting what seems to me the most obvious challenge to the 
claim of popular punishment: the argument that popular sentiments should reflect, 
not constitute reasons for punishment. That is, if there is a right answer to the 
question of how to punish, then it will be determined by reasons for and against 
punishing, and if popular opinion is to be interesting or relevant it must be based on 
and subject to revision by these reasons, not the other way around. In Bagaric and 
Edney’s much cited illustration: “Seeking public views on sentencing is analogous 
to doctors basing treatment decisions on what the community thinks is appropriate 
or engineers building cars, not in accordance with the rules of physics, but on the 
basis of what lay members of the community “reckon” seems about right.” 
(Bagaric and Edney, 2004, p.129; cf. also Golash and Lynch, 1995, p.719) So 
while popular sentiments can be based on or even express the reasons we have for 
punishing (although, as Bagaric and Edney’s examples suggest, we often suspect 
that they are not), they are at best superfluous and at worst mistaken. In a slightly 
more formal way, we may express this as the dilemma of reasonableness:  
1) A belief about whether or not to φ is either 
reasonable or unreasonable. It is unreasonable if there 
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is no reason for or against φ'ing; it is reasonable if 
there is at least one reason for or against φ'ing.9 
2) In forming a belief about whether or not to φ, we 
should not let unreasonable beliefs affect our belief.10 
3) In forming a belief about whether or not to φ, we 
should let the reasons for and against φ'ing affect our 
belief. 
4) We should not double-count reasons. 
5) In forming a belief about whether or not to φ, we 
should let the reasons that support a reasonable belief 
about whether or not to φ affect our belief (from 1 
and 3). 
6) In forming a belief about whether or not to φ, letting 
a reasonable belief about whether or not to φ affect 
our beliefs is double-counting reasons, if we have 
already let the reasons that support this belief affect 
our belief.  
7) In forming a belief about whether or not to φ, we 
should not let a reasonable belief about whether or 
not to φ affect our belief (from 4 and 6). 
QED: Whether a belief is reasonable or unreasonable, we 
should not let it affect our belief about whether or not to 
φ (from 2 and 7). 
To my mind, the dilemma is fatal to the vast majority of arguments for the 
claim of popular punishment encountered in public debates. And it serves the 
purpose of immediately refocusing the debate where many scholars probably feel it 
belongs: on the traditional issues of whether punishment should be based on just 
deserts, deterrence, some third factor or some mixture of factors, as well as how to 
determine the specific policies that would follow from whatever factor(s) we pick. 
Whether they are or are not based on reasons, it seems that we can skip sentiments 
entirely and just get to grips with the traditional debate about the problem of 
punishment. The result is a further condition on the type of argument available to 
the proponent. The argument must show both that popular sentiments do provide us 
with reasons, and that these reasons are different from and cannot be reduced to the 
traditional concerns of criminal justice ethics, such as just deserts, deterrence, 
reconciliation, etc. 
What could such an argument look like? Overall, it seems to me that an 
argument for popular punishment must fall into one of three categories, the proper 
elaboration and individual appeal of which will be determined by background 
assumptions in ethical theory:  
1. There can be an epistemic argument that popular sentiments are truth-
tracking, and that we have a reason for bringing penal practice into 
alignment with them since they provide some reason to think that this level 
corresponds to moral reality.  
2. There can be an institutional argument that popular sentiments are reasons-
creating, and that we have a reason for bringing penal practice into 
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alignment with them since they influence (or even determine) what moral 
reality is.  
3. There can be an instrumental argument that popular sentiments create costs 
and benefits for a system of justice, and that we have a reason of 
beneficence to bring penal practice into alignment with them since this will 
minimize the costs of divergence and maximise the benefits of 
correspondence. 
Let me briefly flesh out each of them in turn before we examine them 
critically in detail in the second half of the paper. 
The epistemic argument must involve something like the following version 
of the second premise: 
iia) informed popular sentiments are fallibly indicative of 
how we have reason to act; and iib) we have a reason to 
act in accordance with how we have reason to think we 
have reason to act. 
The second half of the premise is uncontroversial enough, I believe, that I 
shall set it aside. The first half implies that if popular sentiments hold that we ought 
to φ, then there is a reason to think that we ought in fact to φ. The premise supports 
the conclusion of the argument for popular punishment because, if true, it translates 
directly to the claim of popular punishment once we insert “punish O with P” for φ. 
It tackles the dilemma of reasonableness by challenging the first horn of the 
dilemma: a reasonable belief is interesting in itself because of its evidentiary value, 
where it might be taken to constitute evidence directly for the belief or for the 
soundness or importance of the reasons consistent with it.  
Note that to be charitable once more, I am assuming the claim to be only that 
popular sentiments are fallibly indicative, which is to say that they can be wrong 
but that they are not mistaken so often as to be useless or misleading. We can leave 
open the question of how strong an indication they provide – the range is 
everything between only minimally better than chance and up to near certainty – 
because while this will affect how strong the resulting reason is, the claim we are 
examining is merely that such a reason exists, so any value in the range will do.  
Similarly, the institutional argument will involve something like the 
following version of the second premise: 
iia) Informed popular sentiments express the values of 
members of a community; and iib) we have reason to 
treat members of a community in accordance with the 
values of members of the community. 
Whereas the claim of the epistemic argument is that popular sentiments help 
us discover what we have reason to do, the claim here is that popular sentiments 
provide us with reasons for action that we would not otherwise have had. And such 
reasons emerge because those involved are part of a joint community wherein 
shared (but subjective) values can justifiably determine how persons ought to treat 
each other. It tackles the dilemma by insisting that normative beliefs are reasons-
generating independently of their being based or not based on reasons, but owes an 
account, of course, of why that is the case; the critical part of the premise is likely 
to be the second half, therefore.  
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Note also that there is an important ambiguity concerning ‘members’. 
Depending on how we ultimately defend the premise, we may want to hold one of 
two views. Either that there can be competing sentiments, but that as I have 
previously suggested the strongest can win out, the force of the resulting reason 
being diminished proportionally to but not cancelled by disagreement. Or we may 
wish to hold that only unanimously held sentiments can justify treating members of 
the community in accord with the values they express, since anything else will be 
the imposition of the values of some members of the community on others who do 
not share them. To have any practical importance the argument must hold the 
former, since unanimously held popular sentiments are unlikely to ever obtain in 
modern societies, and I shall assume that this is the version of the argument at 
stake. 
And finally, the instrumental argument involves something like the 
following version of the second premise: 
iia) When actual punishment Pa for O diverges from P 
this imposes costs CPa-P; and iib) we have reasons of 
beneficence to avoid imposing costs. 
Whereas the institutional claim above is that popular sentiments create 
reasons directly by virtue of the normative force of the values they embody, the 
instrumental claim is that popular sentiments provide us with reasons we would not 
otherwise have had only because the sentiments impose costs and benefits on our 
actions in terms of whatever values we take to apply independently. It dodges the 
dilemma by pointing out that even if not directly reasons-generating, beliefs have 
implications for how other reasons cash out. 
The key component in this argument is likely to be the first premise, given 
that the second premise is both widely accepted and strongly opposed by those who 
dissent, so that we are unlikely to be capable of changing anyone’s mind about it. 
The central task of the argument, therefore, will be to make credible the idea that 
over- or underpunishment imposes, or at least is likely to impose, noteworthy costs.  
IV. ASSESSING THE EPISTEMIC ARGUMENT 
I sketched out above how both the general argument and the specific premise 
of the epistemic version must go. Putting the two together we get the epistemic 
argument for popular punishment: 
i) Informed popular sentiments about punishment hold 
that offence O ought to receive punishment P.  
iia) informed popular sentiments are fallibly indicative of 
how we have reason to act; and iib) we have a reason to 
act in accord with how we have reason to think we have 
reason to act. 
The minimal claim of popular punishment: There is at 
least one impartial pro tanto reason to punish in accord 
with informed popular sentiments about punishment, the 
strength of this reason varying in direct proportion to 
both the strength and the prevalence of the sentiment. 
As I noted above, the second half of the epistemic premise is less interesting 
because less controversial than the first. It is not, after all, apparent why or that we 
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should accept that popular sentiments are indicative of moral truth, even fallibly so. 
Indeed, we might think it quite likely that the public could get it as wrong on 
normative questions as on factual ones, if not more so, for at least two reasons: 
First, the methods of establishing moral facts are indisputably both more 
controversial and less precise than those of establishing non-normative facts of 
almost any kind. Second, almost everybody recognizes that the general public has 
been gravely mistaken about important moral issues in the (relatively) recent past – 
slavery, racism and sexism are widely accepted examples – and there is 
overwhelming reason to think that it remains mistaken about other crucial issues – 
the ethics of war, speciesism and poverty aid are prime examples that have strong 
support in the literature. (McMahan, 2009; Singer, 1995; Regan, 2004; Unger, 
1996) Given these concerns, is there any reason to think that public sentiments are 
truth tracking? 
One way of supporting the epistemic premise, which draws on lines of 
argument advanced in the so-called epistemic justification of democracy (Cohen, 
1986; Estlund, 2009), would be to argue that the Condorcet jury theorem applies to 
sentiments about punishment. The Condorcet jury theorem as classically stated 
shows that in any group of people in which individuals are fallible but more likely 
to be right than wrong, the majority opinion in a binary choice situation is more 
likely to be true than false, the probability of its being true increasing with the size 
of the group. (Condorcet, 1785) For populations as big as those involved in modern 
societies the probability swiftly approaches certainty. 
An obvious objection to the application of the classical theorem is that where 
“how we ought to punish?” means e.g. how long we ought to imprison the 
offender, we are not dealing with a binary choice situation, but with a choice 
between a range of options. However, there are formal solutions for applying the 
theorem to non-binary choice situations (List and Goodin, 2001), and it remains 
true that so long as the average person’s choice is better than chance (i.e. the 
probability of selecting the right option is greater than 1/n, where n is the number 
of options) and not less preferred than a false option (i.e. no wrong option has a 
greater probability of  being selected than the right option), the majority have an 
increasing probability of being right the greater the number of participants in the 
decision. And this fits our common-sense views in at least some scenarios. It would 
not be unreasonable to suppose e.g. that if we were to ask people to guess how 
many beans are in a large jar the average guess would become increasingly 
accurate the more people we ask.  
The important question, however, is whether it is reasonable to suppose that 
the sentiments of the average person about the type of issue at stake is reliable 
enough to be at once better than chance and better than all false alternatives. Such 
sentiments are, I have suggested, the results of a largely intuitive judgement that 
involves weighing reasons with and/or against each other to arrive at an opinion, 
such as “offence O should be punished with P”. There are essentially two ways in 
which public sentiments (if reasonable beliefs of this type) could diverge from the 
correct conclusion: they could be based on a different set of reasons (fewer, more 
or other, including supposed but invalid reasons), and they could be based on an 
incorrect weighing of the reasons.11 We ought, I suspect, to be sceptical of the 
epistemic quality of public opinion on both counts. 
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Starting with the weighing, the worry one might raise concerns the 
susceptibility of the type of judgement at stake to cognitive biases. An intuitive 
normative judgement of the sort involved in the claim of popular punishment is 
clearly composite: it must take into account a number of often conflicting reasons. 
The trouble is that as the number of moral factors involved increases, so do both 
the complexity, the possibility of mistakes and the influence of the cognitive 
heuristics necessary to lighten the cognitive load and make an intuitive judgement 
possible.12 However, cognitive heuristics, while undoubtedly helpful and perhaps 
even necessary, unavoidably lead to cognitive biases. As behavioural economics 
has shown in fascinating detail, there are predictable and serious mistakes that 
agents will perform when making intuitive judgements, which are best explained 
by the agents’ employment of generally useful but predictably flawed cognitive 
heuristics. (E.g. Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler, 
2009; Kahneman and Tversky, 2009a; 2009b) 
Let me illustrate with just one bias that we can expect to be prominent in the 
type of judgements we are discussing: anchoring effects. An anchoring effect 
occurs when a person adjusts subsequent estimates in the light of an initial factor, 
which either has no relevant relation to the issue or should not be given the 
influence it is granted.13 In a classic decision theoretical experiment Amos Tversky 
and Daniel Kahneman made two experimental groups observe the results of a 
spinning roulette-wheel, stopping in one case at the number 10 and in the other at 
the number 65. Immediately afterwards participants were asked to guess the 
percentage of African nations which had obtained membership of the United 
Nations, indicating first whether the percentage number was higher or lower than 
the number the roulette wheel had landed on, and second what the percentage was. 
The group who had witnessed the wheel stopping at the number 10 estimated on 
average 25%, while the group that had witnessed the wheel stopping at 65 
estimated on average 45%, a difference that appears both irrational and incredible 
given that it was apparent to both groups that the results of the roulette wheel had 
no relation to the question being asked.14 (Kahneman and Tversky, 1974) 
Obviously, whether or not anchoring effects occur in the context of 
intuitions about punishment is an empirical question, but it seems likely that they 
might. A prime candidate would be the perceived current punishment. If in effect, 
it would exert an intuitive pull towards what the person believes the current 
punishment to be. But of course there can be no guarantee that an anchoring effect 
pulls intuitions in the right direction, nor any reason to believe that the perceived 
level of current punishment would do so. The result would be that we would get 
convergence around the wrong estimate. Whether intuitions in such a case happen 
to have evidentiary value will be an effect of how the convergent level of 
intuitions, the actual level of punishment and the appropriate level of punishment 
happen to be related: if the convergent level is located between the actual and 
appropriate levels then intuitions will temporarily retain evidentiary value; 
although inaccurate, they will at least point us in what is initially the right direction 
(e.g. less severe or more severe punishment). If not, then they will be entirely 
misleading.15  
The second and more fundamental problem for the epistemic argument is 
that there is good evidence that the intuitive judgements at stake fail to take into 
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account the relevant reasons and only the relevant reasons. (Singer, 2005; Greene, 
Sommerville et al., 2001) There is a blooming and extensive literature 
documenting the apparent influence of irrelevant factors on moral intuitions, but let 
me describe just one. In 2008 Simone Schnall, Jonathan Haidt, Gerald L. Clore and 
Alexander H. Jordan published the results of a series of experiments concerning the 
relation between the emotion of disgust and moral judgement. (Schnall, Haidt et 
al., 2008) Briefly, one of their experiments involved asking participants to 
intuitively assess the degree of moral wrongness, if any, in the action of the 
protagonist in each of three different detailed scenarios. All participants were 
seated in an empty office environment during off-hours, but the test group had their 
environment manipulated in that: “[the] workspace was set up to look rather 
disgusting: An old chair with a torn and dirty cushion was placed in front of a desk 
that had various stains, and was sticky. On the desk there was a transparent plastic 
cup with the dried up remnants of a smoothie, and a pen that was chewed up. Next 
to the desk was a trash can overflowing with garbage including greasy pizza boxes 
and dirty-looking tissues.” (Schnall, Haidt et al., 2008, p.7) The results were 
unequivocal: test group participants judged the behaviour of the protagonists in the 
scenarios much more harshly than the control group, i.e. were more likely to judge 
the action wrong and judged it as more wrong on average, although they were 
unaware of the influence of provoked disgust on their judgements.16 Admittedly 
there were variations within the test group correlating with self-reported 
susceptibility to disgust, but the results must be considered disconcerting by those 
who mean to give credit to intuitive judgements of moral scenarios nonetheless. If 
intuitions are to be considered evidence in favour of normative beliefs, then they 
should not vary with such factors as the presence of greasy pizza boxes. 
One final challenge is worth noting. In the preceding I have discussed the 
epistemic qualities of public opinion in isolation. But to support the second 
premise, popular sentiments must meet a more demanding standard than this, for 
they must be not merely fallibly indicative in the sense that they do better than 
chance, but less fallible, i.e. better than the alternative procedure which they are 
meant to correct. Recall that popular sentiments are meant to give us a reason to 
think that we have reason to φ. But while this may be true in situations with no 
contrary epistemic background – although the reservations I have presented above 
suggest otherwise – clearly the claim of popular punishment is meant to apply even 
in the situation where, as today, there exist well-developed theories of criminal 
justice as competitors. And here it is no longer obvious that even popular 
sentiments that met the standard of better-than-chance could give us reasons to 
think that we have reason to φ.  
Consider that given two different measuring instruments, one of which is 
both more accurate and precise than the other, adjusting our beliefs in the light of 
the results of the less accurate instrument is no longer desirable. Return for 
illustration to the bean-guessing example I mentioned earlier, and suppose that we 
now allow a second group of people to measure the jar, look up the average size of 
a bean and calculate an estimate on that basis. In effect this is to allow them to 
make a cumbersome, conscious, calculated assessment of essentially the same 
factors as the members of the first group base their guess on. If we accept 
reasonable assumptions about the advantages of this procedure compared to 
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guessing by sight alone, we would both expect the average of the estimates of this 
second group to be more accurate than the average of the first group, and we would 
expect including the guesses of members of the first group in an average of the 
estimates of the second group to decrease the accuracy. Here the power of the 
Condorcet jury theorem works in reverse: because the estimates of the first group 
are less accurate, as the number of misleading opinions included grows, so too does 
the probability of reaching the right answer rapidly deteriorate to zero. And the 
situation is analogous, because for all its defects and controversy, the 
characteristics of being a cumbersome, conscious, calculated assessment of 
essentially the same factors as popular sentiments are (ideally) based on seems to 
me an accurate (if incomplete) depiction of the work of criminal justice thinkers. 
The possibility remains that popular sentiments are better at tracking moral truth 
than criminal justice ethics, either because it better weighs the reasons or takes into 
account reasons that philosophers have missed. But barring a successful argument 
to that effect, and in light of the concerns I have sketched above, I see no grounds 
for assuming this to be the case. 
In conclusion, although there are perhaps situations in which the average 
person’s intuitive judgement is more likely to be better than chance, the assessment 
of concrete moral scenarios is not necessarily among them. As has been pointed 
out, the problems raised by awkward influences on intuitions may be difficult to 
contain. (Tersman, 2009; Sandberg and Juth, 2010)  It may be hard to cordon off a 
set of intuitions that remain trustworthy, in which case the use of any intuitions is 
cast into doubt, and moral philosophy faces a severe methodological challenge. 
This remains a hotly contested subject in contemporary moral philosophy.17 But 
even if true this can hardly save the epistemic argument. It simply means that 
providing any reason for or against a particular type of punishment is going to be 
much more difficult than we have supposed, if not plain impossible. 
V. ASSESSING THE INSTITUTIONAL ARGUMENT 
Having assessed the possibilities of completing an epistemic argument for 
the claim, let us turn to the institutional version. Recall that the general premise I 
suggested was the following: 
iia) Informed popular sentiments express the values of 
members of a polity; and iib) we have reason to treat 
members of a polity in accordance with the values of 
members of the polity. 
And as I pointed out previously, the critical part is the account of why we 
have reason to treat members in accord with their values. 
One version of the argument might be based on the duties of democratic 
representatives, and allow for the intersection of the participatory and justificatory 
issues that I initially separated. Suppose that there are reasons to have a 
representative democratic institution which makes the decisions regarding 
punishment (e.g. a parliament which legislates for a criminal code containing 
sentencing guidelines), and furthermore that the representatives have reason 
(perhaps in the strong sense of having a moral duty) to represent the demos, i.e. to 
take decisions in accord with the values of the public that they represent. This, it 
seems, could provide the required reason.  
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There might be good grounds for objecting to the assumptions of the 
argument, such as whether representatives genuinely have a reason to represent the 
current values of the demos in the direct way necessary, but let us grant the 
argument these assumptions. Even if we do so, this version of the institutional 
argument fails to provide the impartial reason required by the claim. To see this 
consider that it cannot provide a reason for those represented, only for those 
representing them. The situation is parallel to the situation where an agent has 
made a promise to punish in accord with popular sentiments. Now, moral 
philosophers disagree on whether and if so why and how making promises creates 
reasons for action, but let us suppose for a second that it does. Then, surely, the 
promiser now has a pro tanto reason to punish in accord with popular sentiments. 
“Certainly”, she might say, “I know that popular sentiments are misguided and 
unjust. Impartially, they give us no reason to do anything. But it just so happens 
that I have promised to act in accordance with them. Hence, I have a reason to do 
as they suggest.” Nobody, I suspect, would take this to be the kind of reason at 
stake in the claim of popular punishment, nor are we likely soon to encounter 
proponents of the claim lamenting the fact that they happen to be in a situation 
where they have reason to act in accord with popular sentiments that are otherwise 
unsupported.   
A different variation might start with the widely accepted premise that there 
is reason to let the sentence vary with the severity of the crime, argue that the 
severity of the crime varies with cultural norms, that popular sentiments are, or at 
least can be, an expression of such cultural norms, and that therefore the sentence 
should vary with popular sentiments. Roberts sketches the contours of such an 
argument when he suggests that “the seriousness of any particular act is 
determined, to some degree, by the extent to which it offends community mores.”18 
(cf. Roberts, 2011, p.115-116)  
Now, there are two ways in which community views might affect the 
seriousness of offences. We can imagine that they directly determine, or at least 
affect, the seriousness, i.e. “serious is as the public says”. Alternately, we can 
imagine that sentiments indirectly affect the seriousness, e.g. because the factors 
that determine seriousness, such as the amount of harm caused, are influenced by 
community views. The trouble is that neither is plausibly capable of completing the 
institutional argument. The first reading of the argument implausibly holds that 
mere belief can affect seriousness independent of other factors (such as harm). This 
runs straight into the dilemma of reasonableness, and while it may be possible to 
extend the argument so as to avoid this I confess that I cannot see how. (cf. also 
Ryberg, 2010, p.161-165; Golash and Lynch, 1995, p.714) Meanwhile, the latter is 
really a variant of the instrumental argument. Thus, while it is undoubtedly true 
that sentiments can have this effect, e.g. because harm is at least partially a 
psychological phenomenon and as such is subject to the influence of cultural norms 
(and, we might add, individual psychological idiosyncracies), popular sentiments 
only enter the picture as part of the background conditions which together 
determine how much harm the action causes, and as a result thereof how serious it 
is. The severity remains a function of the harm, not the sentiment. (For a related 
point cf. Golash and Lynch, 1995, p.711-712) 
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Finally, an argument might be made on the basis of the voluntary 
relinquishing of individual rights. Thus, if individuals possess moral rights, e.g. a 
right to liberty based on autonomy, and subjecting them to punishment will 
constitute prima facie violations of these rights, it seems that a system of justice 
must require individuals to conditionally relinquish those rights. And it is arguable 
that at least citizens in a democratic society do so, but on the condition that they are 
capable of collectively deciding the system of justice which they are potentially 
subject to punishment by. Hence, the argument would go, if the system is not one 
that is endorsed (or, endorsable) by the persons subject to it, e.g. because actual 
punishment is disanalogous to the punishment that would be meted out by a system 
consented to, then the conditional relinquishment of rights has not been triggered 
and punishment is unjustified.19 An argument along these lines will mesh well with 
libertarian intuitions, which some may consider an advantage. As Dzur puts it, 
there is a “concern” “prominent in Anglo-American political thought” that 
“…citizens be held accountable only to rules they authorize and understand,” to 
which we might add that they can for the same reasons demand to be held 
accountable only in the way and to the extent that they authorize and understand.20 
(Dzur, 2012, p.117) 
There are potential problems with this line of argument familiar within 
contractualist theory, e.g. about how to account for majority rule and the subjection 
of dissenting minorities to a general system of justice, as well as the necessary 
forms of consent, which will often in practice be implicit. The solutions to these 
problems are not uncontroversial, but I will suppose that contractualists can 
provide satisfactory answers to them. Even granting these assumptions, however, it 
seems that to work in the context of the claim of popular punishment the argument 
requires conflating the hypothetical and actual situations. Thus, traditional 
contractualism will impose a hypothetical contract situation on agents in which it 
might well require that their sentiments with respect to criminal justice count as 
reasons while constructing the social contract. But there is no reason to suppose 
that the actual (irrational, non-ideal) sentiments of a population at any given time 
have any relation to the sentiments individuals would have in such a hypothetical 
situation. In fact, the choice-situation for the contract is typically constructed 
exactly so as to avoid certain biases that afflict the actual choice-situation, Rawls’ 
imposition of the “veil of ignorance” being the classical example. (Rawls, 1999 
[[1971]]) Furthermore, this version of the argument too seems better suited to the 
participatory than to the justificatory issue because, again, it seems it will be hard 
pressed to provide an impartial reason. It could, perhaps, be held to constitute an 
argument in favour of involving the public so as to provide them with the 
opportunity of con- or dissenting based on their actual, current preferences, rather 
than idealised or hypothetical preferences, but it could not, it seems, provide them 
with a reason for or against consenting if they were involved in such a manner. As 
such, it cannot support the claim of popular punishment. 
VI. ASSESSING THE INSTRUMENTAL ARGUMENT  
The last and perhaps most promising of the three arguments is the argument 
that the sentiments of the community can affect the way that other reasons cash 
out, and that in so far as we hold that these reasons influence the way we ought to 
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punish, the sentiments must therefore be taken into account. I formulated this as the 
following attempt at filling out the second premise:  
iia) When actual punishment Pa for O diverges from P 
this imposes costs CPa-P; and iib) we have reasons of 
beneficence to avoid imposing costs. 
The first step for the argument is to make credible the notion that divergence 
will impose costs. Costs of divergence could arise in the form of non-compliance, 
loss of legitimacy and cooperation, increased vigilantism and retaliation, loss of 
communicative meaning, including centrally censorious meaning, and sheer 
frustration, indignation and anxiety as a result of the perceived inadequacy of 
justice. (Golash and Lynch, 1995, p.708-710; Gardner, 2007; Robinson and Darley, 
2007, p.18-31; Roberts, 2011, p.111; Ryberg, 2010, p.152-159) It may even be 
possible to cover a version of the argument for popular punishment according to 
which the cost imposed is disrespect towards the victim of the offence, because the 
punishment does not meet what popular sentiments hold to be the appropriate 
punishment. So it seems there are a range of potential costs, at least some of which 
should be acceptable to most moral theories. Does this mean that we should accept 
the instrumental argument? 
At least some moral philosophers will be little impressed with the 
instrumental argument for the sole reason that they take it that costs and benefits 
cannot justify setting the level of punishment at any particular level. The severity 
of punishment, such absolutists could argue, must be determined solely by 
considerations of justice, and the relevant considerations of justice with regard to 
punishment is just deserts, i.e. what the offender deserves to suffer by reason of her 
offence. For those who hold such a Fiat justitia et pereat mundus-position, the 
instrumental argument is simply unavailable. But given the relative scarcity of 
absolutists in moral philosophy, it may be worth considering what those who are 
willing to grant at least some weight to considerations of beneficence in 
determining the justified level of punishment should think about it.21 In addition, it 
is worth noting that for some costs the instrumental argument can cut across the 
traditional divide between retributivist and consequentialist justifications of 
punishment. If, for example, the function of punishment is taken to be the 
fulfilment of our collective duty to express censure at the wrongdoing perpetrated 
by the offender, then a P-Pa discrepancy that causes the punishment to lose 
censorious meaning imposes a cost, but one which is counted in the deontological 
currency of the loss of our ability to fulfil the duty of expressing censure at 
wrongdoing. (cf. Roberts, 2011, p.112-114) 
Several further objections remain. First, it is worth noting that on the most 
obvious version of the argument it assumes that the costs and benefits emerge from 
the distance between actual popular sentiments and the perceived level of 
punishment, rather than the distance between sentiments and the actual level of 
punishment. Given that studies show that the difference between perceived and 
actual levels of punishment can be substantial, this is an important distinction.  
It also opens the door to an objection based on the relative costs of changing 
actual penal practices and changing perceptions of penal practices. (cf. Ryberg, 
2010, p.157-158) Presumably, if the reasons at stake are reasons of beneficence, 
they cannot support changing penal practice if there is a better (more beneficial, 
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e.g. because less costly) alternative available in altering perceptions of penal 
practices. In the most uncontroversial cases there will be no discrepancy between 
actual and desired punishment, only between actual and perceived punishment. 
Suppose e.g. that penal practices inflict punishment of five months prison for 
offence O, that public sentiments demand at least five months prison for O, but that 
public perceptions of penal practices are that O is typically punished with three 
months prison, and that this divergence has the costs that the argument assumes. 
We can then either change penal practices, i.e. increasing punishment until 
perceived punishment becomes five months, or we can change perceptions until 
perceived punishment becomes five months. If, plausibly, it will be easier and less 
costly to do the second, then clearly this is what we must be taken to have a reason 
of beneficence to do. Studies suggest both that the problem is real and that the 
solution of adjusting perceptions is feasible. (Mirrless-Black, 2002; Indermaur and 
Hough, 2002; Hough and Park, 2002; Bagaric and Edney, 2004, p.129-130) 
However, since I have assumed that we are dealing with informed 
sentiments, this situation may be unlikely to arise. Presumably, an accurate 
perception of actual levels of punishment will be part of any realistically attainable 
maximum level of information. This leaves us with a further choice between 
changing actual punishments or changing popular sentiments. These may be harder 
to alter than the level of information, but there is no reason to assume that changing 
public attitudes in such a way is impossible. (Robinson and Darley, 2007, p.52-66) 
Suppose however, as we should, that, while possible, doing so is itself costly. And 
suppose that we limit the discussion to situations where the costs of changing 
sentiments outweigh the costs of changing practice. Will there not then be reason to 
align punishment with sentiments? 
 
At this point, I am willing to concede. Once we have narrowed the field in 
this way, I do not think we can raise further objections. It remains true that, on the 
occasions when the empirical conditions are met, those who hold that costs and 
benefits play a part in setting the justified level of punishment are forced on pain of 
contradiction to accept that there is at least a(n impartial, pro tanto) reason for 
punishing in accord with popular sentiments. This is hardly surprising, and may 
leave all parties to the traditional debates feeling comfortable. Absolutist 
deontologists will perhaps take it as further proof that consequentialists and 
threshold-deontologists are willing to take all the wrong factors into account all the 
while studiously ignoring the moral trumps that really matter, while their 
opponents should be able to happily agree that in cases where it will have 
beneficial consequences to adjust punishment so as to better align with popular 
sentiments, clearly, this gives us reason to do so. 
The impact of popular sentiments should not be overestimated, though. The 
reason is not decisive. The optimal punishment regime will depend on both 
normative and empirical facts: which costs go into the equation, and how they 
increase or diminish in a concrete social setting according to changes in 
punishment. It might be true for example, as Robinson and Darley argue, that the 
greatest benefits produced by the criminal justice system depend on alignment 
between (the ordinal ranking of) the punishments it metes out and popular 
sentiments, which amounts to the claim that the cost of not meeting popular 
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sentiments outweighs any individual competing cost. But it would remain an open 
question whether marginal deviations from perfect correlation between sentiments 
and punishments would be an all-things-considered improvement. (Robinson and 
Darley, 2007, p.21, cf. also p.45-48; Golash and Lynch, 1995, p.709-711) 
VII. CONCLUSION 
In the preceding I have attempted to clarify what we should understand the 
claim of popular punishment to (minimally) be, how an argument for the minimal 
claim of popular punishment must proceed, and how the difficult second premise 
of such an argument might be filled out. I examined three versions of such an 
argument. There may be others, but I suspect that most or all of them will turn out 
to be variations on the ones I have looked at, and will run into variations of the 
challenges I have described. I have concluded that these challenges are strong 
enough that the first two versions of the argument, the epistemic and institutional, 
are unpersuasive, while there are circumstances under which the third argument 
will give those who accept certain normative presuppositions the reason required 
by the claim of popular punishment.  
Is this a triumph for the proponent of popular punishment then? I have 
argued that we cannot refute the claim, since there is at least one version where 
under certain circumstances at least some ethical principles will support it. And if 
this is enough to satisfy the proponent, then so be it. But it is a modest conclusion, 
and one that will be hard pressed to justify claims of popular punishment as they 
are typically made in practice, because it faces a heavy burden of proof in 
demonstrating that this case, in fact, happens to be one of those where it applies. 
There is a reason, then, why we should care what the public thinks. But for many 
proponents I suspect that this will be one of those cases where you get what you 
want, only find that it was not what you wanted after all. 
 
                                                     
1 I am grateful to Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, Martin Marchman Andersen, Thomas Søbirk 
Petersen, Sune Lægaard, Thom Brooks, Chris Bennett, Jesper Ryberg, Jakob Holtermann, 
Julian Roberts, Richard Lippke and Paul H. Robinson for helpful comments.  
2 An interesting question is whether it would make a difference to the argument for penal 
populism if it was based on the public holding such theoretically-based and reflective 
beliefs. I believe that the criticism I level at the claims of popular punishment based on 
public sentiments could be extended relatively easily to cover such cases, but since it seems 
to concern a claim that nobody in fact makes, nor is likely to make given the negligible 
probability of the general public attaining the requisite background knowledge of moral 
philosophy, I set the discussion and its attending complications aside. 
3 Note that on the definition of a popular sentiment I have proposed, to retain the quality of 
an intuitively formed belief while being increasingly informed, the information must be 
about empirical rather than normative matters. If in addition to informing someone of 
criminology, the law, the penal system and the crimes, criminals and victims we informed 
them of the arguments, principles and positions current in criminal justice ethics, we would 
presumably eventually end up with a belief that was the result of a reflective process and 
more or less identical to one of the existing positions. I shall assume that this is not what we 
understand by being informed. 
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4 Studies show a clear tendency for opinions to become more lenient with respect to 
sentencing the better informed they are. Roberts labels this tendency “one of the most 
robust and often-replicated findings in the field”. (Roberts, 2011, p.105) Note also that 
Roberts advances a different argument for roughly the same position that I here adopt. 
(Roberts, 2011, p.106) 
5 Once again, I think this is being maximally charitable to the proponent of the claim of 
popular punishment. In practice, this assumption is so difficult to work with, since 
counterfactual sentiments are well-nigh impossible to predict and the achievement of wide-
spread maximal informedness is unfeasible, that most actual claims of popular punishment 
will have to find some way of working around it, i.e. by basing the claim on less informed 
sentiments. But while this represents a genuine challenge to putting the claim into practice, 
I want to focus the current discussion on the strength of its foundation. 
6 Robinson and Darley suggest that the diversity of intuitions about punishment may be less 
dramatic than is sometimes assumed. Empirical evidence, they argue, supports the claim 
that there is relative convergence on comparative judgements of offence seriousness, i.e. 
“offence O1 is less/more serious than O2”. (Robinson and Darley, 2007, p.9-11; cf. also 
Robinson, Kurzban and Jones, 2007) Intractable differences of intuition will then rather 
concern the anchoring points of the penal scheme. 
7 This seems to be the point Roberts has in mind when he rejects the “direct 
importation” model of popular punishment, because “one can easily imagine public 
sentiment turning against a particular category of offender or public hostility being aroused 
against a particular offense. If public views were followed, the result would be severity 
premiums for a particular kind of offender or some specific offense—which could not be 
justified by any retributive principles.” (Roberts, 2011, p.103) A different reading of 
Roberts’ argument would not require a balance of reasons, but set retributivist constraints 
on the influence of popular opinion. This reading is supported when Roberts emphasises 
that “a model that directly imports public views throughout the criminal justice system 
would lead to undesirable outcomes.” (Roberts, 2011, p.103) The desirability of such 
outcomes would, on the balance of reasons view, be a function of the relative strength of all 
the reasons at stake, and it would therefore be an open question whether direct 
implementation or maintaining status quo would better fit the outcome deemed desirable on 
a balance of reasons in each case. Only on a constraint view could we say beforehand with 
any degree of certainty that the results would be undesirable. Overall, I believe the balance 
of reasons position is the more plausible view. 
8 A requirement along these lines fits with general principles of metaethics accepted by 
many moral thinkers, such as Gerald Cohen’s interpersonal test or Richard Hare’s 
universalisability condition, (Hare, 1972; Cohen, 1991) but I need not make the 
controversial claim that impartiality is a general condition for a reason’s being valid in 
moral or political reasoning. I shall stick to the simpler and less controversial claim that it 
suitably constrains the reasons at stake in the claim of popular punishment. 
9 Some might argue that under this definition there can be no unreasonable beliefs about 
whether or not to perform an action, since there will always be at least one pro tanto reason 
for or against performing any conceivable action, or perhaps more modestly that this will as 
a minimum apply to any realistically relevant action. I do not have any firm belief about 
whether or not this is the case, but it seems to me that I could concede the point while 
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maintaining the thrust of the dilemma with respect to the argument for the claim of popular 
punishment. 
10 Some may prefer to speak of “making a decision of whether or not to φ” and letting 
beliefs affect our “decision” e.g. because the phrasing I have employed may seem to 
suggest moral internalism, where normative beliefs are themselves motivating or even 
determinate of an agent’s actions, which many thinkers would prefer not to assume. I 
believe that the dilemma holds on either version, and so do not mean to imply a particular 
stand with respect to the internalism/externalism-debate. Furthermore, and in a similar vein, 
some may wish to read "a belief about whether or not to φ" as "a belief about whether or 
not we ought to φ", or, even more elaborately, "a belief about whether all things considered 
we have reason to φ". I take the three to be identical in the context of the dilemma, and so 
have used the simplest formulation. 
11 Some might object that I have defined such sentiments as intuitive, and that the process 
of weighing reasons is reflective. This is true on a more narrow understanding of intuition 
sometimes applied in moral philosophy, but not on the looser meaning I employ here. It 
seems to me that much – but not all – of our practical reasoning consists of weighing 
reasons in a way which is spontaneous, fast and unreflective, so that we are not conscious 
of the details of the process, and would struggle to put it into words. 
12 The alternative is to shift to a reflective process of deductive reasoning. But once we do 
that we are no longer dealing with the type of belief at stake in the claim of popular 
punishment. 
13 Other notable candidates well described in the literature include e.g. availability and 
representativeness, the first of which concerns the tendency to overestimate the relative 
weight of prominent or emotionally charged factors, and the other the tendency to 
overestimate the relative weight of common or average factors. We might suppose e.g. that 
the first influences perceptions of offences or punishments based on the degree to which 
they can be visualised and become emotionally significant when so imagined, and that the 
second influences perceptions based on the degree to which the particular state of a moral 
factor is considered “normal”. Another prime candidate drawn from the philosophical 
literature is pure time discounting, which is highly intuitive to most persons, but extremely 
hard to justify. (Parfit, 1984; Cowen and Parfit, 1992; Broome, 1994; Cowen, 2001) 
14 A somewhat similar objection concerns the difficulty of establishing empirically what the 
intuition responds to. (Golash and Lynch, 1995, p.720-725) The objection differs, however, 
in that it does not fundamentally challenge whether intuitions track the relevant features of 
the situation, but only our ability to identify which features of the situation are being picked 
out by any particular intuition, and hence our ability to formulate general principles from 
composite judgements of individual cases. 
15 An objection at this point might be that I have already, for charitable reasons, assumed 
that a number of potential sources of error were not present in the sentiments at stake. I 
have assumed, recall, that these sentiments are informed, consistent, and weighable. Could 
we not simply adopt similar charitable assumptions at this point? I think not. While there is 
no sharp distinction between the sources of error at stake, it seems to me that we could 
narrow the field and educate the public in order to derive a set of actual sentiments that met 
the first three assumptions, while no such possibility exist for the problems sketched in this 
section. While it is perhaps theoretically possible to avoid cognitive biases and distorting 
influences (see below), it seems to me unrealistic to expect that we could achieve it with 
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public sentiments in practice. A different way of putting the point is that we could adopt 
such “charitable” assumptions for these problems too, but doing so would make an 
argument based on them vacuous since it effectively empties the field of candidate 
sentiments, and thus would hardly be a service to the proponent. 
16 Some might object that this seems an example of disgust affecting the weighing of 
reasons rather than introducing a reason. There is some difficulty, I think, in distinguishing 
the two in cases like this. A related experiment by Haidt is perhaps more suggestive, since 
it introduces the factor of disgust directly into the scenarios persons are asked to assess, and 
shows equally strong intuitive responses, indeed responses so strong as to be maintained 
when test subjects are pushed to admit that they cannot explain why their disgust-response 
should constitute a reason. (Haidt, 2001)  
17 Contemporary defenders of intuitionism include Robert Audi (Audi, 2005), Roger Crisp 
(Crisp, 2006), Michael Huemer (Huemer, 2007) and Derek Parfit (Parfit, 2011). 
Generalizing, one common line of defence is that there are certain fundamental intuitions 
which we can justify as reliable in the face of otherwise confusing factors, such as the 
intuition that welfare is good while harm to welfare is bad, or the intuition that we have 
reason to promote welfare. It seems safe to say at least that the position has not been 
abandoned yet. 
18 Slightly earlier and in the same vein Roberts argues that: “Seriousness ratings and 
sentencing factors (for example) should reflect public opinion not for instrumental 
reasons—because the public will have more confidence in or respect for sentencing—but 
because community views constitute an inherent element of crime seriousness.” (Roberts, 
2011, p.114) However, Roberts’ point may perhaps be better understood as concerned with 
the participatory issue, and advocating the use of popular sentiments through some form of 
public input – Roberts favours sociological research over democratic participation – to 
properly calibrate punishments so as to achieve the ends determined independently. This 
seems to me a more persuasive point. In any case it is not clear to me and I do not mean to 
suggest that he advocates the contractual argument in the shape I here present it. 
19 Note that the claim need not be, and plausibly should not be, that punishment is thereby 
all things considered unjustified. It can be unjustified in the limited sense of there being a 
pro tanto reason against it, which is all that the minimal claim of popular punishment 
requires.  
20 Note that Dzur takes this to be an argument against institutional insulation. Whether it is 
so depends on whether one believes that it is explicit or potential consent that does the 
normative work. If the former, then institutional involvement is required to meet the 
condition; if the latter, then it suffices that the solution arrived at is one that citizens would 
consent to, i.e. that it aligns with their sentiments. Also note that the argument here is 
related to but different from the form of retributivism which takes punishment to be the 
rectification of a balance of benefits that has been disturbed by the unfair advantage the 
criminal has gained through enjoying the protection of the law while refusing the 
restrictions of liberty that granting that protection to other members of society would 
constitute. (Murphy, 1973) For criticism of using this as the basis of the claim of popular 
punishment cf. (Golash and Lynch, 1995, p.715-716) 
21 I believe that the majority of retributivist thinkers will want to be non-absolutists and 
must therefore face the argument, especially of course those that accept Hart-style mixed 
theories, such that the institution of punishment can be fundamentally justified by its 
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beneficial consequences. But not much depends upon whether this is true: absolutists can 
reject the argument at the cost of certain other difficulties, while non-absolutists can avoid 
the difficulties absolutism raises at the cost of having to face the argument. Whether one or 
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